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Wrongful Death-"CHILD" AS USED IN WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE INCLUDES
UNACKNOWLEDGED POSTHUMOUS ILLEGITIMATE-Weaks v. Mounter., - Nev.
-, 493 P.2d 1307 (1972).
"With liberty and justice for all" is a familiar phrase upon which the
American system of jurisprudence is founded. Yet society has been slow
to allow a large number1 of its citizens2 to enjoy the benefits of such equal
justice. Exemplifying this inconsistency is the stigma that envelops illegiti-
macy. "Illegitimacy is a way of life-a second-class way of life, imposed
not only by the fact of birth outside a family, but by law as well." 3 The
fact that society has accepted and continues to accept this legislatively en-
forced discrimination against illegitimate children, while favoring legitimate
children, may rest on the same ground as the inferior position of other classes
throughout history-prejudice.4
In the recent case of Weaks v. Mounter,5 a posthumous illegitimate child
brought an action for the wrongful death of her putative father. Although
the undisputed facts demonstrated that the child was the natural child of
the deceased, the opposition argued that because the deceased had never
signed a declaration acknowledging the child, as required by statute,6 the
child was not an heir within the contemplation of the Nevada Wrongful
Death Statute,7 and therefore could not bring a suit for the wrongful death
1 An estimated 96.9 out of every 1,000 children born in 1969 were illegitimate. THE
WORLD ALMANAC & BooK oF FAcTs 73 (L. Long ed. 1971).
2 Illegitimates are subject to the same obligations as other citizens. For example, they
must pay identical taxes and face military induction just as their legitimate contem-
poraries. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
3 Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MicH. L. REv. 477 (1967) [herein-
after cited as Krause].
4 Id. at 498.
5 - Nev. -, 493 P.2d 1307 (1972).
6 NEv. REv. STAT. § 134.170 (1967 replacement page) provides:
Every illegitimate child shall be considered as an heir of the person who shall
acknowledge himself to be the father of such child by signing in writing a dec-
laration to that effect in the presence of one credible witness, who shall sign the
declaration also as a witness, and shall in all cases be considered as heir of the
mother and shall inherit in whole or in part, as the case may be, in the same
manner as if born in lawful wedlock. Illegitimate children shall be legitimatized
by the intermarriage of the parents with each other. Children, so acknowledged
or so legitimatized, shall have all the rights of inheritance of legitimate children.
7Nzv. REv. STAT. § 41.080 (1969 replacement page) provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or de-
fault, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in
respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the persons who or the corporation
which would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action
for damages notwithstanding the death of the person injured and although the
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of her putative father. The Nevada Supreme Court ruled that a posthu-
mous8 illegitimate child could sue for the wrongful death of her putative
father, even though the father had not acknowledged paternity in accord-
ance with the statute.
Because there is no common law right of recovery for wrongful death,9
the courts have generally strictly construed' 0 the applicable wrongful death
statute," limiting recovery to the beneficiary or class of beneficiaries enu-
merated therein.12 Since the purpose of the wrongful death statute is to
compensate members of the family who might have received support or
assistance from the deceased had he lived, the beneficiaries are selected
death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to a
felony.
NEV. Rxv. STAT. § 12.090 (1971 replacement page) provides that in such cases "the action
may be brought by the heirs of the deceased or by his personal representative or guar-
dian for the benefit of his heirs."8 NEv. REv. STAT. § 134.140 (1967 replacement page) provides that for inheritance or
succession purposes "posthumous children are considered as living at the death of their
parents."
9 Krantz v. Harris, 40 Wis. 2d 709, 162 N.W.2d 628 (1968).
In order to prevent family feuds and to encourage peaceful coexistence among the
subjects of the realm, early Anglo-Saxon law regarded homicide as a private wrong.
Damages for the wrongful killing of a kinsman were payable to the relatives of the
deceased. Medieval Anglo-Saxon law termed such payment "bot," "wer," or "wergild"
meaning "mans-price" or "man-payment." Later, after social and legal attitudes towards
homicide changed, homicide was viewed as a wrong not merely against the decedents
survivors, but also against the state. By the late thirteenth century, every homicide had
become a criminal offense. Because the offender forfeited his goods to the crown, it
was useless for the family of the deceased to attempt to obtain them. S. SPEIsER, RECOv-
ERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATrH, § 1:2, at 4 (1966) [hereinafter cited as SPEIsER].
The common law rule denying a right of recovery for wrongful death arose in the
case of Baker v. Bolton, 170-Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808), when Lord Ellenborough, in
a dictum, stated that in "a civil Court the death of a human being could not be com-
plained of as an injury." Id. § 1:1, at 2.
Although Lord Ellenborough's dictum was accepted in the United States, Hawaii
rejected Baker v. Bolton at an early date, and therefore still retains a common law
right of recovery for wrongful death. Id. § 1:3, at 8.
10 SPEIsm, supra note 9, § 10:4, at 588.
11 Lord Ellenborough's dictum was widely accepted by the courts and as a result, it
was more beneficial to the defendant to have killed his victim than to have merely
injured him. Because this construction could not be tolerated, the Fatal Accidents Act
(better known as Lord Campbell's Act) of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, was enacted. This
statute provided a basis for the remedy for wrongful death that is currently in force
in nearly every state. W. PROSSER, HAN-DBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 902 (4th.
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PRossm]; SPEISER, supra note 9, 5 1:8, at 13.
12 SPEISER, supra note 9, § 10:1, at 580; Annot., 72 A.L.R.2d 1235 (1960).
For example, Lord Campbell's Act specified the beneficiaries as being the husband,
wife, parent, or child of the deceased. Many American wrongful death statutes have
limited recovery to a similar exclusive group. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 127, at 904.
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according to these expectations.' 3 Generally, the courts have not construed
such statutes to include illegitimate children within the class of "children"
designated as beneficiaries.14
Recovery has been allowed more often for the wrongful death of a mother
than for the wrongful death of a father.'5 Statutes in at least four states'6
provide that an illegitimate child may recover for the wrongful death of
his mother. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in Levy v. Louisiana"7
held that the meaning of surviving "child" under a wrongful death statute
includes an illegitimate child.is The Supreme Court based its decision on
13 PaossER, supra note 11, § 127, at 904. Cf. Wolfe v. Lockhart, 195 Va. 479, 78 S.E.d
654 (1953):
The purpose of the wrongful death statute is not to allow damages solely to those
who might look to decedent for support. Statutory beneficiaries who may have
had no reasonable expectance of support from the decedent may recover or loss
of care, attention and society, as well as for suffering and mental anguish caused
them by his death (headnote of case).
14 E.g, Walker v. Hall, 122 Ga. App. 11, 176 SZ.2d 246 (1970); Brinkley v. Dixie
Constr. Co., 205 Ga. 415, 54 S.E.2d 267 (1949); Stieve v. H.R.H. Constr. Corp, 63
Misc. 2d 409, 312 N.YS.2d 464 (1970).
"A bastard is not a 'child' within Lord Campbell's Act" TiFxANY, DEATH BY WRONG-
nm AcT § 85, at 203 (2d ed. 1913).
This is merely an application of the principal that statutes patterned under Lord
Campbell's Act which use the word 'kin' mean legitimate kin, and that where
statutes say 'father' or 'mother,' 'children,' 'brothers' or 'sisters,' they mean only
legitimate father, mother, children, brothers, or sisters. SPEISER, supra note 9,
§ 10:4, at 587.
But see Armijo v. Wessellus, 73 Wash. 2d 716, 440 P.2d 471 (1968) ("child" or "chil-
dren" in wrongful death statute includes legitimate as well as illegitimate children of
deceased parents).
15Di Medio v. Port Norris Express Co, 71 NJ. Super. 190, 176 A.2d 550 (1961);
Sneed v. Henderson, 211 Tenn. 572, 366 S.W.2d 758 (1963); Krantz v. Harris, 40 Wis. 2d
709, 162 N.W.2d 628 (1968); Krause, supra note 3, at 478; SPEISER, supra note 9, § 10:4,
at 588-89. See also Sanders v. Tillman, 245 So. 2d 198 (Miss. 1971), where the court recog-
nized a right of recovery for the wrongful death of an illegitimate's mother but held
that denial of a right of recovery for the wrongful death of an unacknowledged illegiti-
mate's putative father was not a denial of equal protection.16 Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on
Legitimacy, 44 TExAs L. REv. 829, 856 (1966), enumerates the following jurisdictions,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 67, § 4 (Cum. Supp. 1971); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 11-7-13 (1972); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 537.070 (1959); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1953 (1962).
17 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
18 The United States Supreme Court, in Levy, overturned a decision of the Louisiana
Court of Appeal that had affirmed the trial court in holding that a surviving "child"
under the wrongful death statute did not include an illegitimate child. Both the trial
court and the Court of Appeal used as its reasoning the principle that denial of such a
right of recovery was "based on morals and general welfare because it discourages
bringing children into the world out of wedlock." Krause, supra note 3, at 492, suggests
that this principle and similar rationale "raises the question whether a law may properly
punish one in order to evoke guilt feelings in another whose conduct is to be affected.""
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the premise that because the circumstances surrounding the child's birth
have no relation to the nature of the injuries resulting in the wrongful death
of the mother, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
precludes denial of the right of illegitimate children to maintain an action
for the wrongful death of their mother. 9
In cases involving the wrongful death of the putative father, however,
courts have generally agreed that no recovery for the illegitimate child lies20
unless the putative father has either legitimated the child by subsequent
marriage to its mother,21 stood in loco parentis to the child (the child ac-
tually being dependent upon the father),22 or formally acknowledged the
child in accordance with the applicable statute.2s The descriptive tide,
19 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70-72 (1968).
20 E.g., Bullock v. Sinclair Ref. Co, 160 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Young v. Viruct
de Garcia, 172 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1965); Walker v. Hall, 122 Ga. App. 11, 176 S.E.2d 246
(1970); Whatley v. Dupuy, 178 So. 2d 438 (La. 1965); Finn v. Employers Liab. Assur-
ance Corp., 141 So. 2d 852 (La. 1962); State v. Try, Inc., 220 Md. 270, 152 A.2d 126
(1959); Bonewit v. Weber, 95 Ohio App. 428, 54 Ohio Ops. 20, 120 N.E.2d 738 (1952).
But cf. Juarez v. System Leasing Corp., 15 Cal. App. 3d 730, 93 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1971)
and Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 254 A.2d 525 (1969), whereby statute the father
was obligated to support the minor child whether legitimate or illegitimate and therefore,
the illegitimate child was allowed recovery for wrongful death of the father.
21 See, e.g., Krantz v. Harris, 40 Wis. 2d 709, 162 N.W.2d 628 (1968).
22 
"Thus the illegitimate children here involved were dependents of their natural
father both in fact and in law . . . It would be a denial of equal protection to refuse
them a remedy available to a legitimate child." Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 202, 254
A.2d 525, 529 (1969).
23 Sanders v. Tillman, 245 So. 2d 198 (Miss. 1971), held that denial of recovery to an
unacknowledged illegitimate child is not denial of equal protection; In re Consolazio's
Estate, 54 Misc. 2d 398, 282 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1967), where paternity not established in
court proceedings, denied recovery; in Carroll v. Sneed, 211 Va. 640, 179 S.E.2d 620
(1971), decedent's acknowledged illegitimate child, being decedent's only beneficiary of
the first class, was entitled to amount recovered by decedents administrator in wrongful
death action; Krantz v. Harris, 40 Wis. 2d 709, 162 N.W.2d 628 (1968), allowed recovery
only if paternity is established pursuant to the statute relating to heirship of children
born out of wedlock, or if legitimization is accomplished by subsequent marriage; Krause,
supra note 3, at 478, states that an illegitimate child cannot inherit from his father unless
his father has formally recognized or acknowledged him.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61.1 (Cum. Supp. 1972) provides that:
Whenever in proceedings . . . concerning a child whose parents are not married,
a man admits before any court having jurisdiction to try and dispose of the same,
that he is the father of the child or the court finds that the man has voluntarily
admitted paternity in writing, under oath, or if it be shown by other evidence
beyond reasonable doubt that he is the father of the child and that he should
be responsible for the support of the child, the court may then enter and enforce
judgment for the support, maintenance and education of such child as if the
child were born in lawful wedlock.
Such other evidence that the man should be responsible for the support of the
child shall be limited to evidence of the following:
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"posthumous illegitimate child," itself shows that the father had failed to
legitimate the child by marriage, and had not lived long enough to qualify
the illegitimate child as a dependent.2 In Weaks, although no question of
his fatherhood arose, the decedent had failed to formally acknowledge pa-
ternity in accordance with the statute. The undisputed facts further revealed
that the expectant parents had planned to marry, and that the culmination
of these plans was prevented only by the death of the father.25 Because the
marriage ceremony would have provided the legitimization of his child, the
future father conceivably could have decided to forego the "unnecessary"
acknowledgment proceedings, which required the "signing in writing [of]
a declaration. .. in the presence of one credible witness." 26 This would
seem to be a normal reaction-one that has possibly occurred in previous
cases where marriage plans were left unexecuted, usually to the detriment
of the later born child.27
Clearly, the courts must protect themselves against dishonest impostors
who would fraudulently allege the paternity of one wrongfully killed. How-
ever, the courts should recognize that those individuals who contend they
are illegitimate children of a decedent bear a heavy burden of proof that
should (as it does in other cases) provide ample protection.28 It would
(1) That he cohabited openly with the mother during all of the ten months
immediately prior to the time the child was born; or
(2) That he gave consent to a physician or other person, not including the
mother, charged with the responsibility of securing information for the
preparation of a birth record that his name be used as the father of the child
upon the birth records of the child; or
(3) That he allowed by a general course of conduct the common use of his
surname by the child; or
(4) That he claimed the child as his child on any statement, tax return or other
document filed and signed by him with any local, state or federal govern-
ment, or any agency thereof.
Contra Bonewit v. Weber, 95 Ohio App. 428, 54 Ohio Ops. 20, 120 NZ.2d 738 (1952);
Dilworth v. Tisdale Transfer & Storage Co, 209 Tenn. 449, 354 S.W.2d 261 (1962) held
that in an action for wrongful death, an illegitimate child can not recover even though
his father has acknowledged the child. But see Armijo v. Wesselius, 73 Wash. 2d 716,
440 P.2d 471 (1968), which held that the wrongful death statutes do not provide for
legitimization, and the written acknowledgment provision in the descent and distribu-
tion statutes applies only for purposes of intestate succession.
2 4 t would be difficult to establish, in this case and in similar cases, any degree of
dependency of the unborn child on the father, especially where the parents are neither
living together nor is the mother receiving support from the father.
2
Z - Nev. -, 493 P.2d 1307, 1309 (1972).2
6 Nv. REv. STAT. § 134.170 (1967 replacement page). See note 6 supra.
27 Krantz v. Harris, 40 Wis. 2d 709, 162 N.W.2d 628, 629 (1968).
28Armio v. Wesselins, 73 Wash. 2d 716, 440 P.2d 471 (1968). "We should not assume
that finders of fact will not intelligently and justly resolve issues of paternity based upon
the evidence before them and guided by the law." Carroll v. Sneed, 211 Va. 640, 643, 179
SE.2d 620, 622 (1971).
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indeed be an admission of the failure of the legal system to say that in order
to prevent fraudulent claims from being successful, all claims must be pre-
vented, including those that are genuine.
While acknowledgment in accordance with the statute is evidence that
the decedent believed he was to become a father, certainly such a formality
does not conclusively prove his paternity. In the case of a child born within
a marriage, there is no similar acknowledgment requirement, but rather a
presumption that the husband is in fact the father of the child.29 Further-
more, it is neither logical 'nor just that the law should discriminate against
a person not yet born for the nonfeasance of another. It is equally unjust
that when a child's claim of damages for the loss of his father is in issue, the
tortfeasor should escape liability merely because the child's father failed to
comply with the acknowledgment statute.30
"[I]ilegitimate children are not 'nonpersons.'... They are clearly 'persons"
within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend.
ment." 31 It is submitted that "[t] o grant the right to sue for the wrongful
death of the natural father of a legitimate minor child, to such child, and
at the same time, solely by reason of status created by legislative enactment,
to deny such right to an illegitimate minor child appears to be an artificial
discriminatory barrier which should not be recognized or tolerated in the
law." 32 "Humane consideration and the realization that children are such,
no matter what their origin, alone might compel us to the construction
that, under present day conditions, our social attitude warrants a construc-
tion different from that of the early English view." a3
In a society in which the family is the basic social structure, the law can
never fully prevent the illegitimate child from being socially inferior to his
legitimate contemporary.34 Even though social discrimination is likely to
continue, the law should not falter in allowing equality to the extent it can
90Such a presumption has often been upheld ad absurdwn as exemplified in Whitman
v. Whitman, 140 Ind. App. 289, 215 N.E.2d 689 (1966), where the court held that a child
born in 1962 to the wife of a man who had undergone a vasectomy in 1946, and had been
found sterile by medical examination prior to the trial, was legitimate.
See also A. KINSEY, SExUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 416 (1953) which states
that among married women an estimated 26 percent have experienced extra-marital coitus
by age forty.30See also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
31 id. at 70.
2 Juarez v. System Leasing Corp., 15 Cal. App. 3d 730, 93 Cal. Rptr. 411, 415 (1971).
a3 Carroll v. Sneed, 211 Va. 640, 643, 179 S.E.2d 620, 622 (1971) quoting Middleton v.
Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1934). "The burden of illegitimacy in
purely social relationships should be enough, without society adding unnecessarily
to the burden with legal implications having to do with the care, health, and welfare
of children." Armijo v. Wesselius, 73 Wash. 2d 716, 721, 440 P.2d 471, 473 (1968).
84 Krause, supra note 3, at 505.
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afford8 5 Only after the law has recognized the illegitimate child as the
equal of the legitimate will society begin to ease the burden of discrimina-
tionplaced upon such children. Although much legislative progress has been
made in elevating the position of the illegitimate child, 6 there is no valid
excuse, moral or legal, for the continuation of legislatively and judicially
enforced discrimination. Both Weaks and Levy are demonstrative of a cur-
rent progressive trend in our law that is directed at eliminating the unneces-
sary discrimination against illegitimate children. This trend will prove bene-
ficial, not only to the unfortunate illegitimate child, but to the whole of
society as well.
H. S. L.
35 Id. emphasizes that "the argument that the law cannot make blacks white nor
whites black provided no reason against legislating racial equality:'
80 "Indeed, fortune appears to smile upon the lot of the illegitimate who in times
past was saddled with life's infirmities but could not always reap its benefits." Weaks v.
Mounter, - Nev. -, 493 P.2d 1307, 1309 (1972).
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